This is the second part of the interview with Kako Nubukpo – Full Professor of Economics at the University of Lomé (Togo), former WAEMU Commissioner in charge of Agriculture, Water Resources, and Environment, former Minister of Long-term Strategy and Public Policy Evaluation in Togo, and currently working at IFAD. Prof Nubukpo, interviewed by Sofia Scialoja, hd candidate at Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italy, addresses some of the key issues raised in his third book L’Afrique et le reste du monde – De la dépendance à la souveraineté ("Africa and the World – From Dependency to Sovereignty") (Odile Jacob, 2024). The interview primarily discusses his conceptualization of sovereignty and strategic autonomy, his position on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) promoted by the African Union, as well as his views on the CFA franc monetary system.
You can read the first part here.

In your book L’Afrique et le reste du monde – De la dépendance à la souveraineté, you explore the concept of sovereignty across different responsibilities...

Digital, industrial, food, monetary... A hidden fact: at the beginning, the subtitle was supposed to be "From Dependence to Interdependence". The idea is to move from dependencies, something that is suffered, to interdependencies, something that is constructed and articulated with the rest of the world.

Would the goal of sovereignty be autarky? And how do you link the concept of sovereignty to interdependence?

No, the goal would be strategic autonomy; autarky is only conceived under the terms of limitations. Interdependence is about alliances: I decide not to produce a specific good because another country can supply it at a lower cost. Economically, it’s more profitable not to produce it. This doesn't mean I couldn’t supply the population with that good if the borders were closed. First, we should improve the transformation of our commodities, progressing from raw materials to processed exports...

How can this be applied to the African context? Or should it be applied directly at the global level?

At both levels. At the continental level, there are ongoing negotiations on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). At the international level, for Africa, it will perhaps come through negotiations with the WTO or as part of the economic partnership agreements with the EU.

In the past, you have often spoken out against the AfCFTA...

I have reservations. Conceptually, I make no distinction between the continent and the rest of the world: my analytical framework is linked to the performance of production systems. If Morocco performs better than Greece in a certain area, it shouldn’t get more advantages just because it’s an African country... The AfCFTA could exist, but it should raise the question of budget transfers. And, ideally, it should move towards what we call fiscal federalism: i.e., the recognition that different performances between production systems should be reflected in the recognition of other contributions by states so that, collectively, we can close the competitiveness gap. In short: compensation, but also capacity building.

In other words, what the EU does...

Exactly. And we don’t even need to go as far as AfCFTA. In the case of regional economic communities like ECOWAS, Gambia’s annual GDP is equivalent to 23 hours of work in Nigeria. So, if we put Gambia and Nigeria in the same market, Gambia will disappear. In fact, at the ECOWAS level, the principle of free movement of people, goods, services, and capital exists, but in practice, it’s not practical. States protect themselves with what we call ‘abnormal practices’: the increasing number of checks and blockages at customs on lorries, which significantly increase transport costs; invoking security issues to prevent transporting goods...

Which other states generally defend themselves the most?

All states. Smaller states use this approach much more and, therefore, create rigidities in traffic; larger states, on the other hand, can take drastic actions. For example, Nigeria decided for a long time to close its border with Benin unilaterally, violating the principles of free movement. The problem was the huge number of Beninese vehicles returning to Nigeria.

Do you think that the free movement of goods and people is actually feasible?

I think that the economy cannot be independent from the rest of society and politics. My main critique is with the vision imposed by the IMF, the World Bank, and increasingly by the EU and the WTO, where the economy and finance are treated as autonomous from the rest of society. The free-trade discourse defies regulatory institutions such as fiscal federalism or capacity-building so that less well-performing countries can gradually build up their own resilience. What worries me is that those who promote this line don’t go all the way. The two consequences of the neoliberal system are price flexibility and the mobility of production factors. But we can see that those prices, particularly in Africa, are dictated by large monopolistic groups: they are not competitive. In every country, oligopolists control several sectors. It's a self-sustaining system. An international paradigm is applied at the national level, according to each country's specificities.

You see the AfCFTA as it stands now as part of a wider project, well beyond the continent, which is that of a global market... Does this remove any specificity of the African area?

Exactly. And that’s why the project is being applauded by all the big multinationals. Although the African Union says there will be rules to ensure the African origin of products supplying the African market, these origins won’t be checked by local institutions because they don’t exist. So, every time we are told to dismantle barriers first and then people will adapt, I reply that the most immediate way to adapt is to migrate. But visa policy doesn’t allow that: this global “free market” paradigm doesn’t logically allow for the free movement of people. And that's where my argument for protectionism comes in: it’s because free trade is not accepted by its own promoters.

Which African countries want the AfCFTA the most?

The Moroccans. For example, Algeria may be more prosperous than Morocco, but Morocco performs better. I prefer the notion of ‘performance’, which means having a more developed productive transformation. And: South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia... Paradoxically, Nigeria took a long time to sign the AfCFTA agreement because it is naturally protectionist.

Staying in West Africa, how has your position on the CFA franc[1] evolved?

What I've observed is that there’s a coward’s equilibrium: it’s in no one’s interest to deviate unilaterally. Nigeria, for example, is very attached to its currency, the naira. The naira enables Nigeria to resolve its internal political problems, such as the transfer of oil resources from the wealthy regions of the South to the poorer but powerful Sahelian regions of the North. It should not be forgotten that Nigeria is a federal state... and this south-north transfer was at the root of the Biafra civil war in 1967/68. So, the management of the surplus is something that Nigeria does not want to share with other West African states because its currency is connected to its budget.

Is Nigeria the main player blocking the proposed ECOWAS[2] eco currency[3]?

That’s why I say it’s a balance that won’t budge: on the one hand, there’s Nigeria; on the other, there are the Francophone countries. They no longer want Nigeria since it accounts for two-thirds of West Africa’s GDP. And if you enter into a monetary union with such a country, it takes the lead. And the Francophone countries are not ready for that.

On the other hand, there is also a third alternative: a currency shared by the Francophone countries of the WAEMU, like the CFA franc… It’s also called ‘eco’...

This is what led to the confusion. In December 2019, when Presidents Ouattara and Macron announced the replacement of the CFA franc by the eco, they were thinking of an eco that would succeed the CFA franc in the WAEMU area extended to ECOWAS. There are two levels to the game: the formal level and the shadow level. At the formal level, there are two eco agendas: one that began in 1983, which proposes a currency for the fifteen ECOWAS states; and the other, the Francophone agenda, which is that of the CFA franc, which decided in 2019 to change the name of the CFA franc to the eco. This is why there has been talk of an ‘unfriendly operation’ that Ouattara and Macron wanted to carry out on the ECOWAS eco.

What is the difference between the two ‘ecos’?

ECOWAS has its own monetary structure with the West African Central Bank. The Francophones are playing a double game: they say they want to build a currency for the whole of ECOWAS, and then they propose something else. It's all very muddled: the question is whether it’s deliberately muddled or not. This is the shadow level.

Unlike the CFA franc, would the eco be detached from the euro?

The ECOWAS eco, yes. But not the one proposed by the Francophone countries.

So, what would be the difference with the CFA franc?

That's the question everyone is asking!

What exactly is France's role today in relation to the CFA franc?

As we know, the exchange reserves held in France were returned to the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)[4]. Now, as long as the CFA franc is linked to the euro and accepts the free movement of capital, there is no possible monetary policy for the CFA countries: it’s the impossible trinity[5]. What’s more, France continues to guarantee the unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc, having obtained a provision from Brussels. Now, since the CFA franc is linked to the euro, the European Central Bank should have guaranteed it. This is not the case, and it’s not even the Bank of France, which could have direct relations with the BCEAO. Instead, it is the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the French Treasury, Bercy. Let’s make a comparison with Nigeria: 80% of its exchange reserves are in pounds, kept in the UK. But this is a relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Bank of England: at no point does the British Treasury intervene. That’s why the French case is anomalous.

Why does France continue to guarantee the West African CFA franc, when the counterpart of the guarantee – the exchange reserves – have been returned?

I think it’s a political issue for France. The fact that it controls currency issuance in fourteen[6] African countries gives it symbolic power and important diplomatic negotiating power worldwide. It illustrates the idea of a French pré-carré (prerogative). So, it’s not necessarily a conspiracy, as shown in some videos being circulated, probably made by the Russians, where the French are said to be loading gold from northern Mali into helicopters... But I like to revert to the American formula: “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem” for the French: "The CFA franc is your currency, but it’s our problem".

Criticizing the CFA franc creates substantialeconomics popular and electoral consensus, as it remains the colonial symbol par excellence. However, keeping the CFA franc maintains a certain degree of monetary stability. Is the political rhetoric against the CFA franc devoid of any real will?

Monetary stability is not monetary sovereignty. The construction of monetary sovereignty must necessarily go through more complicated stages, such as major instability. What’s more, millions of rural people are kept in the dark and are in fact being exploited via the CFA. The CFA is a system transferring surpluses from the rural to the urban world. Where do these exchange reserves come from? From coffee, cocoa, and cotton producers, used as collateral. So, despite the stability offered by the CFA, if you look at the human development indicators, the Togolese are no more developed than the Ghanaians or Nigerians – who have a currency that fluctuates. We must never forget the distribution of wealth within Francophone West Africa, generated and illustrated by the CFA system.

 

[1] The CFA (“Communauté Financière Africaine” / “African Financial Community”) franc refers to two different currencies used in Africa: the West African CFA franc, used by the WAEMU countries, and the Central African CFA franc, used by six Central African countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo), which form the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). The two monetary unions are linked by monetary cooperation agreements with France. Moreover, France is also linked to the Comoros, with the Comorian franc (KMF). The CFA franc has a fixed exchange rate to the euro. In this interview, the focus is on the West African CFA franc, although some of the discussed dynamics are also applicable to the Central African CFA franc.

[2] ECOWAS stands for the Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO in French). It has fifteen members, three of which officially withdrew in January 2025: Benin, Burkina Faso (withdrew), Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (currently suspended), Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali (withdrew), Niger (withdrew), Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
WAEMU stands for the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA in French). It has eight members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau (since 1997, although not Francophone), Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

[3] The “eco” is the name adopted for an alternative currency to the West African CFA franc.

[4] Since 2019, the BCEAO is no longer required to deposit 50% of its exchange reserves with the French Treasury. In contrast, the exchange reserves of the CEMAC countries and Comoros are still divided between their central banks and the French Treasury (at least 50% for CEMAC and 65% for Comoros).

[5] The impossible trinity is an international economics concept developed by John M. Flemig and Robert A. Mundell, stating that it is impossible to have an independent monetary policy combined with a fixed exchange rate with a stronger zone and free capital movement.

[6] Comoros can be added.