Introduction
The recent fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime , led by the rebel-jihadist group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (former Jabhat al Nusra) and others, seems to have reshaped Syria’s identity. While the priority remains to reestablish the order, the proliferation of a potent synthetic drug, called Captagon continues to worry the Middle East and beyond. [A1] As the new transitional government prepares to dismantle the structure built by the old regime, this may not lead to much, as demand remains unchanged across the region.
This article aims to report the previous involvement of Assad’s regime in the production and trade of Captagon, with a view to possible change at this turning point for Syria.
A diplomatic weapon
On May 8, 2023, Syria rejoined the Arab League after a 12-year expulsion. One of the factors that led to this event was the growing concern among Arab states over Captagon. In exchange for readmission, the Assad regime pledged to combat the lucrative trafficking of this drug, whose primary market lies in the Gulf states. However, it is widely recognized that the regime itself profited significantly from this trade. Assad, who had little intention of combatting the Captagon trade, appeared to be determined to allow its expansion to consolidate his grip on power.
Beyond generating significant profits for the Syrian government, Captagon has become a powerful diplomatic weapon wielded by Assad, who was in charge of what could be called a “narco-state”. It should be noted, however, that the definition of narco-state applied to Syria appears quite controversial. As stated by experts, the spreading and intensification of drug trafficking should be seen as a direct consequence of the state’s weakness. Also, the group of actors involved in this trafficking is quite heterogeneous, from the previous Government itself to its allies, such as Hezbollah, to other non-state actors and rebel groups.
Nevertheless, given that the regime controlled many of the ports and borders used by smugglers and that the centers of production were situated in regime-controlled areas, we can deduce a significant involvement of Assad’s apparatus.
The involvement of the regime
The turning point that led to the transformation of Syria into a major hub of Captagon’s production was the outbreak of civil war in 2011. The collapse of state and security structures, including border controls, created a power vacuum ideal for drug production. Furthermore, the porous borders, wartime chaos, state fragility, and economic sanctions have enabled the actors involved in Captagon production to consolidate and expand their trafficking networks. In addition, the absence of seizures in the areas previously controlled by the regime, suggests that the state was allowing the production and trafficking of Captagon, deriving a direct profit from it.
For all these factors, it is possible to state the complicity of the regime, as the major aim appeared to be to consolidate power and ensure the survival of the political elite. This consolidation of power also occurred through the diplomatic relations that Syria has been trying to normalize. While Assad promised to implement measures to combat drug trafficking, the reality showed that only some “farce-measures” were actually been taken, for example by arresting some opposition linked-vendors, to show others Arab countries that something was actually being done.
The link with the regime was made evident also by the networks tied to key figures in the Assad regime, including the dictator’s brother, Maher al-Assad. As commander of the elite 4th Armored Division, Maher facilitated the production and distribution of the drug. This allowed this criminal industry to thrive under the protection of the regime, to the detriment of a population enduring a severe humanitarian crisis, with over 200,000 deaths and 12 million displaced.
In 2021 alone, foreign authorities intercepted $3.5 billion worth of Captagon produced in factories predominantly controlled by Maher al-Assad. Moreover, the drug trade provides a critical influx of foreign currency. It is estimated that around 90% of the foreign currency entering Syria originates from the Captagon trade. This data appears to be decidedly significant, as it allowed to circumvent the international sanctions to the advantage of the elites.
Regional implications
Although the exact value of the Captagon market is uncertain, it is estimated to be worth approximately $5.7 billion. The Gulf states serve as the primary consumers of Captagon, with Saudi Arabia accounting for nearly 50% of global consumption. In Saudi Arabia specifically, the drug is primarily used recreationally and as a stimulant, particularly among youth, due to its relatively low cost of $10–20 per pill. In Syria, by contrast, low-quality Captagon pills are sold for as little as $1 each, earning it the nickname "the poor man’s drug." However, Captagon appears to be a multi-use drug, as it leads to stimulant effects and productivity increase, but it can also be used for recreational purposes. Due to its versatility, Captagon can become a competitive drug even in other markets outside the Middle East.
The scale of the problem is evident from the numerous seizures made by authorities. For instance, in September 2023, authorities in Dubai intercepted a shipment of Captagon worth over $1 billion. Similarly, in June 2024, Jordanian authorities confiscated 9.5 million Captagon pills at the border with Saudi Arabia.
An important role is played by Jordan itself, at the center of the traffic towards the Gulf States. These traffics have long been a source of tension between the two neighboring countries, exacerbated by numerous airstrikes conducted by the Jordanian military [A5] on Syrian soil, aimed at dismantling Captagon production points near the border. In this regard, one high-profile incident likely linked to Jordan is the airstrike that killed Merhi al-Ramthan, a notorious drug lord, in Syria’s Sweida province near the Jordanian border, which occurred one day after Syria’s readmission to the Arab League.
However, we should question the legitimacy of these attacks, which have been carried out in violation of Syrian territory and which can also hit civilians without any reason, as tragically occurred during the January 18, 2024 airstrike. The legal and ethical implications of these cross-border strikes must be critically examined, balancing the urgency of addressing Captagon trafficking against the risks to civilian lives, perpetually exposed and condemned throughout the Middle East.
A structure difficult to dismantle
A decade-long war, international sanctions, and a severe economic and humanitarian crisis have pushed Syria to increasingly rely on the production and trafficking of Captagon. It is important to note that even if Assad’s regime is no longer standing, the drug economy might be so deeply entrenched that dismantling it could prove exceptionally difficult. While recent years have seen a de-escalation of the conflict, partly due to the defeat of the Islamic State, there has been a concurrent expansion in drug trafficking. Furthermore, as of 2025, the new Syrian government still does not have control over the entire territory, with a permanent state of general insecurity.
This trade now involves not only Syria’s neighboring countries, primarily Jordan, whose border with Syria has become a critical transit point for shipments to Gulf States, but the entire Middle East and even Europe. Regarding Europe’s role, it seems to be less affected by direct consumption and more by its position as a transshipment hub, having become a key waypoint for Captagon destined for Arab countries. Europe’s increasing prominence in this capacity is highlighted by the July 2020 seizure at the port of Salerno, where 84 million pills were confiscated by Italian authorities. That said, Europe’s involvement should be a matter of grave concern for international authorities, which must prioritize the Captagon problem on their political agenda.
Future perspectives
Syria’s emerging narco-economy should be seen as both a product and a perpetuation factor of conflict. While Captagon diffused production emerged in conjunction with the outbreak of the civil war, it was one of the principal obstacles to peacebuilding and the restoration of legality. On the other hand, measures adopted by Western Countries, such as the Captagon Act (USA), focused mostly on sanctions, resulted ineffective, unable to have a real grip on the problem. In addition, Arab countries have demonstrated a lack of interest in cooperating with the USA, preferring an approach aimed at normalization, which also failed compared to Assad’s blackmail. It remains to be seen how the new Syrian government will try to eradicate this problem.
One thing is certain: thinking of adopting measures to zero production will not solve the problem. As long as demand exists, production will continue, albeit in different forms and places. It is crucial to learn from the past, and in particular from the failed “war on drugs”, which has led to nothing but an increase in drug production and violence. Instead of criminalization and stigmatization of consumers, it is necessary to treat them as a public health issue. It is up to the states most involved in the consumption of Captagon, the only ones with the right legal basis, to do this, focusing on applying long-term awareness-raising and education measures, especially among the youngest. As long as the Captagon trade will be considered a Syria-specific problem, it will not be fully understood.